

## The Enduring Legacy of 1914: Historical Dissent, the Ligue des droits de l'homme, and the Origins of 'Pacifisme nouveau style'

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**Summary:** *One of the cornerstones of the new pacifism which emerged in France at the very end of the 1920s was a profound historical dissent, particularly with regard to the origins of the Great War. The locus of that debate over the entire interwar period was most often the Ligue des droits de l'homme (LDH), that quintessentially republican, cross-party political organisation which in so many ways defined republican politics between the wars. For French pacifists, more so than for their British counterparts, the question of historical dissent, of the legitimacy of the last war, of the Great War, was integral to their political vision of peace. Central to that vision of peace was not the couple franco-britannique, but rather the festering relationship between France and Germany. This article examines, therefore, the pacifist trajectory within the largest interwar, non-partisan, republican political organisation in France, the Ligue des droits de l'homme. The Ligue was riven over the entire interwar period by debates on pacifism, peace, the Peace, and the relationship of France with Germany. It makes an ideal case study of the pacifist impulse and its origins. Some might argue that it was pacifism which killed the Ligue des droits de l'homme by 1939. In fact, this paper maintains that it was the festering legacy of the German problem, the problem of 1914, which both begat the new pacifism and at the same time ultimately destroyed it and the Ligue.*

**Keywords:** *France, Germany, interwar pacifism, origins of the Great War, historical dissent, Ligue des droits de l'homme.*

**Résumé:** *Une des pierres angulaires du nouveau pacifisme qui a vu le jour en France tout à la fin des années vingt était une profonde dissidence historique, en particulier vis-à-vis des origines de la Grande Guerre. Pendant toute la période de l'entre-deux-guerres ce débat se déroulait au sein de la Ligue des droits de l'homme (LDH), l'organisation républicaine par excellence qui a presque défini, à elle seule, la politique républicaine entre les guerres. Pour les pacifistes français, plus que pour leurs homologues britanniques, la question de la dissidence historique, de la légitimité de la dernière guerre, de la Grande Guerre, faisait partie intégrante de leur vision de la paix. Cette vision de la paix tournait non pas autour du couple franco-britannique, mais en revanche autour de la relation ulcéreuse entre la France et l'Allemagne. Cet article examine donc la trajectoire pacifiste à l'intérieur de la plus grande organisation politique républicaine en France, la Ligue des droits de l'homme. La Ligue était profondément*

*divisée à travers l'entre-deux-guerres par des débats sur le pacifisme, la paix, La paix, et aussi sur la relation de la France à l'Allemagne. Cette relation en fait une excellente étude sur le pacifisme et ses origines. D'aucuns diraient que le pacifisme avait déjà tué la Ligue des droits de l'homme en 1939. En effet, le présent article soutient l'argument que c'est l'héritage difficile du problème allemand, du problème de 1914, qui non seulement a donné naissance au nouveau pacifisme, mais aussi, en même temps, a fini par l'anéantir et avec lui la Ligue des droits de l'homme.*

**Mots-clés :** France, Allemagne, pacifisme de l'entre-deux-guerres, origines de la Grande Guerre, dissidence historique, Ligue des droits de l'homme.

One of the cornerstones of the new pacifism which emerged in France at the very end of the 1920s was a profound historical dissent, particularly with regard to the origins of the Great War (Ingram, 1991: 122-25). The locus of that debate over the entire interwar period was most often the Ligue des droits de l'homme (LDH), the quintessentially republican, cross-party political organisation which in so many ways defined republican politics between the wars. Unlike what Martin Ceadel has called the "force pacifism" of the British peace movement, a more ethically-inspired vision of peace which rejected the instrumental use of force, interwar French pacifism was avowedly political. It was what Ceadel would call "war pacifism", even an "international war pacifism" (Ceadel, 1987). What was objected to was war itself. This means that for French pacifists, more so than for their British counterparts, the question of historical dissent, of the legitimacy of the *last* war, of the Great War, was integral to their political vision of peace. Central to that view of peace and of post-war politics was not the *couple franco-britannique*, but rather the festering relationship between France and Germany.

The apparent implosion of the LDH following the collapse of France in 1940 can, in fact, be imputed directly to the Ligue's position during the Great War and subsequently on the question of war origins and war responsibilities. All else flows from the original political position of support for the Union sacrée, which was staked out by the Ligue's leadership in 1914-15. Unremarked upon at the time, it was the effect on the Ligue of the events of the Great War which would provoke its ultimate demise, a slide into political oblivion that was complete by 1939 - in short, *before* the Nazi invasion of 1940 - and from which the LDH has never fully recovered. By the time the Nazis arrived in France in 1940, the LDH was a carapace of what it had been only five years earlier (Ingram, 2008, Ingram, 1999). The two world wars are thus intimately linked, not only in German, but also in French history. It was not pacifism which killed the Ligue des droits de l'homme, as some might be tempted to argue, but rather the contested legacy, the moral and political ambiguities of 1914 (Ingram, 2010a; Ingram, 2010b).

It was this same contested legacy which ultimately destroyed French pacifism, as well. If, as Ceadel argues (Ceadel, 1981), British pacifism became an "ethic of ultimate ends", using a Weberian analogy, then in the French case pacifism became a "*politics* of ultimate ends". The political nature of French pacifism in turn was based on a deep historical dissent with roots extending back to the earliest days of the Union sacrée in 1914. Thus, while common cause could be, and was, made with British pacifists in the interwar period, the actual motor of French pacifism was the *mißlungene Verhältnis* with Germany.

The *locus in quo* of this development in France was the Ligue des droits de l'homme. For the majority within the Ligue, German war guilt was incontrovertible. It was used to justify and explain France's titanic struggle against Germany during the Great War. Once enunciated, the Ligue clung doggedly to it in the face of all evidence to the contrary, until at last Hitler and the Nazis seemed to provide them with an *ex post facto* rationalisation for their pre-1933 political positions.

Along the way from 1914 to 1939 what hamstrung the Ligue des droits de l'homme then was the contested legacy of the First World War. Three different discourses on the issues at stake in 1914 occurred in the first year and a half of the war, the sum total of which was pregnant with consequences for the future. First, if one examines Ligue discussions of the dangers posed to France in early 1914 before the July Crisis, these dangers were conceived in uniquely domestic terms. Alsace-Lorraine was barely on the radar screen, and the danger did not come from across the Rhine. Secondly, once the war began, a sudden shift in Ligue thinking occurred, and Germany was now singled out as the nation *par excellence* where democracy was lacking, thereby justifying a kind of secular crusade against an infidel Reich. Thirdly, however, there was an inconvenient truth, and this was that Russia was France's ally. Ligue spokesmen paradoxically began to insist that Russia was, in fact, a liberal democracy.

## I. The Enemy is Within

The year 1914 opened for the Ligue des droits de l'homme like many others. For the Ligue's president, Francis de Pressensé, the great issues facing the LDH were essentially domestic and internal. The Republican tradition and the heritage of 1789 were threatened by a reactionary tendency in French politics that went all the way back to the Second Empire. Only in a fleeting mention of the danger posed by what he called a "panic militarism" could one construe any reference to events to come outside France. Instead, the real danger was essentially the Action française (De Pressensé, 1914: 1-2).

The enemy at the beginning of 1914 was therefore not specifically German, even if, as will become clear, there was considerable anxiety about Alsace-Lorraine and, increasingly, Germany. The German question was merely one amongst many. The Ligue seemed far more concerned with issues such as alcoholism, reform of the police, prostitution and sexual hygiene, and the innumerable claims made on its time and resources by French people who had fallen foul of the administrative law.<sup>1</sup> That said, the German problem was on the horizon. The Ardennes federation, in its meeting of 16 November 1913, and perhaps largely under the impetus of Jeanne Mélin, who was to have an important career as a pacifist militant in the interwar period (Ingram, 1991: 88)<sup>2</sup>, passed a motion protesting in the strongest possible terms "the chauvinist excitations which, on both sides of the border, threaten to aggravate the antagonism of the two countries", an antagonism which the motion considered disastrous not only for France and Germany, but for civilisation in its entirety. It demanded a Franco-German rapprochement, which it saw as the only means of equitably resolving the festering Alsace-Lorraine question (Anon., 1 January 1914: 50). The interesting thing, given what was to follow, was the insistence on a shared problem, that of chauvinist excitement on both sides of the frontier. Chauvinism was certainly not exclusively German. In sentiments which were to be echoed after the war by some German pacifists in the pages of *Die Weltbühne* (Ströbel, 1920: 417)<sup>3</sup>, the semi-official organ of the Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte (DLfM), militarism and super-heated nationalism

were seen as a common Franco-German problem, and not the province of Germany alone. Even “barbarism”, which was to enjoy such a long and storied career as a favoured trope of French propagandists excoriating the German variant, seemed in early 1914 to be first and foremost a French problem - at least as far as the Dreyfusard Left was concerned. Jean Jaurès, speaking at the funeral of Francis de Pressensé in February 1914, stressed the extent to which France itself was infected by the anti-intellectual virus of intuition, as opposed to reason, and called French youth and the Ligue to arms to “counter the ignominy of the inferior forces of barbarism which claim, with an unheard of insolence, to be the guardians of French civilisation” (Jaurès, 1914: 176) - yet again a not-so-veiled attack on the Action française.

In fact, during the first few months of 1914, before Europe spiralled into war, one could quite easily make the case that the Ligue’s gaze was directed inwards, that in much of the rhetoric of its speakers and in the motions passed by many of its sections, the great danger continued to be the perceived unholy domestic alliance of church and military. No less a person than Henri Guernut, the secretary general of the Ligue, argued in a speech on the “crisis of the Republic” given at Chauny in the Aisne on 1 February 1914 that the danger came from the “militarist and clerical reaction” (Guernut, 1914: 506). Many were the sections, too, that continued to pass motions condemning the three-year military service law of 1913, and the often harsh sentences meted out to young soldiers of the previous class who had protested the sudden extension of their period of service from two years to three.

## II. A Crusade for Democracy

The 1 July 1914 issue was the last number of the *Bulletin officiel de la Ligue des droits de l’homme* published until April 1915.<sup>4</sup> The July Crisis intervened and the Ligue rallied around the Union sacrée. A large part of the Comité Central went to the colours in the mobilisation order of 2 August 1914, and perhaps as a result of the lack of manpower, no minutes were taken at the meetings of August, September and October (Comité Central, 1 January-1 April 1915: 19).<sup>5</sup>

Once the war began, a shift in Ligue thinking occurred, and Germany suddenly became evil incarnate, a nation which had to be defeated precisely because of its undemocratic nature. This putative lack of democracy was used as a sort of latter-day Jacobin justification for a crusade against Germany.<sup>6</sup> Ferdinand Buisson, the Ligue’s new president following the sudden death of Francis de Pressensé in January 1914, declared that for the Ligue, the First World War was a “democratic crusade of deliverance” - deliverance first of all of Belgium, secondly of all countries “annexed by force and oppressed”, and lastly, in a clear reference to the perceived danger posed by German militarism, deliverance of “Europe, which is compelled, if it wishes to live in peace, to extinguish by floods of blood the hearth of perpetual fire”. Buisson ended by reminding his readers that it was France which had taken this “generous and redoubtable initiative”, and that as a consequence, its very existence was at stake (Buisson, 1 January-1 April 1915: 10). The most important Ligue statement on the war was a short book by Victor Basch (Basch, 1915), which originally appeared in the *Bulletin* in May 1915, but was published as a book later that year. Originally entitled “La Ligue des droits de l’homme et la guerre” (Basch, 1 May 1915: 65-175), it served as the point of departure for all Ligue debates on war origins and pacifism right through to the Ligue’s collapse in 1940.

The essential question according to Basch was to know which nation was the aggressor, and whether France had done everything in its power to avoid war and preserve peace. This was the question he set out to answer by a close reading of the coloured books<sup>7</sup> published by the various powers on the origins of the war. Basch recognised, as indeed do virtually all recent historians (Williamson and May, June 2007: 335-387), that the causes of the Great War were many: some near, some distant, some visible, still others invisible. He admitted that it was impossible to know with certainty which precise elements had led to the war, but he insisted nevertheless on the need to explain how he and those around him saw the origins of the war (Basch, 1 May 1915: 69).

So, who was responsible for the outbreak of the war? According to Basch, after carefully reading the documents, “no doubt can persist as to the series of events that led to war or to the fixing of responsibilities” (Basch, 1 May 1915: 69). Basch concluded that, in the first instance, “before any negotiations, Austrian diplomacy believed war with Serbia to be inevitable”. Secondly, in Basch’s view, it was incontrovertible that Germany was prepared to support the Dual Monarchy in what it viewed as the latter’s righteous demands. Thus, while the Entente powers, with the addition of Italy, sought a pacific solution to the crisis, only Germany was in favour of merely localising it (Basch, 1 May 1915: 72-74). He went through the various stages of the July Crisis minutely, and came to the conclusion that Germany was the main culprit because it alone of the great powers seemed to refuse the possibility of conciliation, particularly after the Russian general mobilisation of 31 July. While Austria appeared prepared to consider measures aimed at defusing the crisis, the German position actually hardened, according to Basch (Basch, 1 May 1915: 91-92). The violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans, which Niall Ferguson claims the British were prepared to do as well (Ferguson, 1999: 443), set the tinder ablaze.

It was clear, therefore, to Basch at least, that Germany and Austria were responsible for starting the war; Austria because it had declared war on Serbia initially, a war it knew would lead to a European conflagration, and Germany because it did not rein in its Austrian ally (Basch, 1 May 1915: 97-101). This, despite the fact that Basch agreed with the notion that Austria had the right to chastise Serbia; how this might have been achieved without engaging the Russians was left unexplained.

### III. The Principle of Nationalities and the Problem of Russia

If the Ligue supported the Union sacrée and the French war effort out of a deep-seated Jacobin republicanism and a desire to see Alsace-Lorraine return to the French fold, it did so also because it believed, in the words of Lloyd George, that “this is a war of nationalities” (Lloyd George cited in Ruysen, January 1916: 1). Théodore Ruysen, in a long-awaited essay on “The Problem of Nationalities”, published in January 1916, recognised that this question did not merely concern the Balkans, Serbia, or Belgium, but that any “enlightened observer” in 1914 should have been able to see that there were other areas of Europe where the nationality question was thorny: Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, to name but a few.

Happily for Ruysen’s analysis, Russia seemed to have moved to the side of right in the first month of the war by announcing to the Poles that they would have complete political autonomy, and guaranteeing to Russian Jews the same rights as their Orthodox compatriots. This, despite the fact, that the Comité Central had, at its meeting of 22 March 1915, heard

a report read by none other than Victor Basch “on the lamentable situation of Russian Jews *since* the war” (my emphasis) (Comité Central, 1-15 December 1915: 448).

The putative change in Russian practice seems to have allowed Ruyszen to state categorically that with the era of wars of religion definitely over - Protestant Berlin, Catholic Vienna, and Muslim Constantinople were allies, after all - what created the “natural and necessary solidarity” between the central powers was that none of them had “ever known how, or wanted, to accord justice to peoples they had conquered” - democracy, in other words (Ruyszen, January 1916: 3). Interestingly, the reproach that Ruyszen made to all three empires was that none of them had ever succeeded in “assimilating” the peoples it had conquered. The Germans could not “Germanise” the Alsatians and Lorrainers, any more than the Habsburgs could bring order out of the chaos of an empire in which “at least a dozen heterogeneous, jealous, and hostile nationalities co-existed side by side, with none assuming a decisive preponderance”. As for the Turks, the best that could be said of them was that they “camped” amongst conquered peoples “sword in hand” (Ruyszen, January 1916: 4).

On the Allied side, by comparison, despite admitted difficulties in Ireland, North Africa, Finland and Poland, Ruyszen claimed that, “all things considered, the group of allied powers represents, in their struggle against the empires of force, the continuity of the liberal tradition to which the newly-enfranchised nationalities owed their liberation in the course of the nineteenth century”. According to Ruyszen, “there is hardly a national movement to which, separately or together, France, England and Russia have not lent the support either of their political influence or of their arms” (Ruyszen, January 1916: 6). Leaving aside for a moment the decidedly difficult questions of Ireland and North Africa, it is nothing short of astounding to see the Russian Empire assimilated into the camp of the liberal democracies.

#### IV. From One War to the Next

Does any of this matter? After all, the 1930s surely presented the *Ligue des droits de l’homme*, to say nothing of the democratic project more generally, with starker choices and clearer issues than had been the case in 1914. On one level this is very true. Hitler undoubtedly represented something new and extraordinarily dangerous in German and European history. The *bona fides* of a democratic crusade against Germany was immeasurably stronger in 1939 than it had been in 1914. But on another level, there is a striking parallel between the political discourses of the second half of the thirties and the first year of the Second World War on the one hand, and those we have examined from the 1914-15 period on the other, despite the fact that the debates of the 1930s seemed to be moving almost in slow motion compared to those of twenty years earlier. The year 1914 appears in retrospect to be a sudden paradigm shift, whereas the run-up to the Second World War seems, on the contrary, to be tired, resigned and somewhat inevitable - a settling of old accounts. Ferdinand Buisson, the *Ligue’s* much-venerated President recognised the paradigmatic importance of 1914 when he defined the *Ligue’s* work in 1920 as primarily “the struggle in favour of the right of humanity to realize peace through international justice”. No longer was the *Ligue’s* fundamental remit the defence of individual rights - even if that continued to occupy much of its time and energy - but rather henceforth the *Ligue des droits de l’homme* was engaged in an essentially political campaign in support of peace and collective rights, with “still more ardour than it had brought to the defence of the rights of man and citizen” (Buisson, 1920: 3).

Thus, as in 1914, so in the 1930s, there was a perceived internal enemy: domestic French fascism - what before the Great War had been called clerical-militarist reaction. The by now genuinely pacifist minority of the Ligue took to heart the arguments of yesteryear about the ongoing dangers posed to French democracy by the French extreme right, and insisted that France had to sweep before its own door. The real enemy was not Hitler, it was Coty, Doriot, de la Rocque, and the other representatives of what was believed to be French fascism.<sup>8</sup>

The Ligue's minority also refused to believe that the real danger lay across the Rhine. It refused to engage in a second Union sacrée, and declined what it saw as the poisoned cup proffered to it in the form of a new crusade of the democracies against external fascist threats. It rejected categorically Romain Rolland's 1936 call for an "indivisible peace", or, in other words, collective security (Rolland, 6 February 1936: 1; Pioch, 30 January 1936: 1; Challaye, 6 February 1936: 1; Challaye, 19 March 1936: 2).<sup>9</sup>

As in 1914, so in the mid-1930s (until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and then once again after June 1941, there was also the Russian factor. Instrumental in the creation of the Popular Front, the Ligue was torn apart by 1937 by the perceived need to support Soviet foreign policy and its domestic mouthpiece, the Parti communiste français. Once again, thinking it had learned the lessons of the recent past, the Ligue's minority spurned the Russian connection, believing support of French democracy utterly incompatible with support of an undemocratic regime involved in the wholesale purging of large numbers of its own citizens.

The democratic traditions of a more distant Revolutionary past also came into sharper focus for the Ligue's minority (Ingram, September 2004: 315-30). Drawing inspiration from the prewar Robespierre of 1791 and early 1792, the pacifist minority likened the impending crusade of the democracies against Nazi Germany to the Girondin machinations in favour of war in 1791-2. Like a mantra, they chanted Robespierrist slogans such as "the peoples do not like armed missionaries", and "one does not bring freedom at the tip of a bayonet", to indicate their deep opposition to any crusade for democracy. What they did not see was that Hitler was different, and that the stakes had changed. Thus, to use the words of the titles of books by one of the *minoritaires*, what began as a critique of *L'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay* and *Le Mythe des guerres de légitime défense*, led ineluctably to *La Légende des démocraties pacifiques*, only to end with the horribly mistaken 1939: *La Guerre de l'imposture*, published in 1941 in occupied Paris (Demartial, 1926, 1931, 1939, 1941).

The minority was hardly an inconsequential group. Its leading lights were highly articulate and visible public intellectuals, many of whom sat on the Ligue's Comité Central.<sup>10</sup> Although its real numbers had undoubtedly shrunk by the time of the 1937 Tours Congress of the Ligue, nevertheless the fact that just over eleven per cent of the votes cast on the eve of another world war went against the Comité Central's motion on the best way to defend both democracy and peace indicates that the theses of the minority continued to find a certain resonance within the larger Ligue.

Mistaken the *minoritaires* might have been, but the moral conviction they brought to the question is without doubt. They were convinced that 1914 had been a terrible civilisational mistake, and that France, the nation of the rights of man, bore a huge

responsibility in the outbreak of war. Everything else flowed from this appreciation. The rot (as they saw it) in French domestic politics, the rise of the dictators, the collapse of German democracy, the venomous state of European international relations, the impending Second World War, everything flowed from what they believed to be the moral mistake of 1914. As Mathias Morhardt, the former secretary-general of the Ligue des droits de l'homme, wrote in March 1936 in a letter to Georges Demartial, the author of the four books cited above: "For the past twenty-two years, you and I have suffered an unspeakable moral and intellectual martyrdom... because we are expiating the honour of belonging to a class of Frenchmen that is far too small. We are those, in effect, who suffer more from an injustice committed by France than from an injustice committed against her." (Mathias Morhardt, 19 March 1936)<sup>11</sup>

It is clear that the death agony of the Ligue des droits de l'homme began during the Great War. There was a great deal of noisy political activity in the years following 1918. The Ligue did much that was good; interwar France would have been a poorer place without it. But like a slowly developing disease whose symptoms are not at first visible, the legacy of the First World War meant that over twenty years later, when the Nazis invaded France, the Ligue des droits de l'homme was already *in extremis*.

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### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The emphasis on domestic issues even extended to an early meeting of the Société d'Etudes Documentaires et Critique sur la Guerre, where one member wrote in a letter to Michel Alexandre that he thought the only two essential questions in early 1916 were the fight against alcoholism and that against neo-Malthusianism! See unsigned police report dated 20 March 1915 in Archives de la Préfecture de Police, BA. 1775.

<sup>2</sup> The "Correspondance Jeanne Mélin" is available in the Fonds Bouglé at the Bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris.

<sup>3</sup> Ströbel wrote, with regard to the occupation of Darmstadt, Frankfurt and Homburg by French troops, that “French militarism has appeared as the helpmate of German militarism, if not consciously, then at least de facto. Because every nationalist wave causes militarism to crest, and the French military action (‘Einmarsch’ in the Ruhr in 1920) stimulates nationalist instincts.”

<sup>4</sup> The first number of the *Bulletin* in 1915 covered the period 1 January to 1 April 1915.

<sup>5</sup> Members mobilised with the secretary general, Henri Guernut, were Célestin Bouglé, Emile Glay, Sicard de Plauzoles, Georges Bourdon, Félicien Challaye, Alcide Delmont, Dr Doizy, Henri Gamard, Dr J. Héricourt, Emile Kahn, Léon Martinet, Louis Oustry, Amédée Rouquès, Henri Schmidt and Daniel Vincent.

<sup>6</sup> On the place of crusading on the spectrum of possible positions in the peace-war debate, see Martin Ceadel’s useful typology in Ceadel, 1987: 43-71.

<sup>7</sup> Basch had carefully gone through the French *Livre Jaune*, *Das deutsche Weissbuch*, *Correspondence and Statements in Parliament: Correspondance du gouvernement britannique relative à la crise européenne*, the *Österreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch*, the *Livre orange russe*, the *Livre gris belge*, the *Livre bleu serbe*, as well as two analyses, the first by Durkheim and Denis (1915), *Qui a voulu la guerre?* (Paris: A. Colin), and the second by E. Denis (1915), *La Guerre* (Paris: Delgrave).

<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, given the subsequent scholarly debates about the left- versus right-wing origins of French fascism, interwar pacifists had no such conceptual difficulty; they saw fascism as coming from both ends of the political spectrum. The historical literature on the existence, or not, of French fascism is huge. Representative works examining the question from different perspectives are: René Rémond, (1954 and many subsequent editions) *La Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours*. Paris: Aubier; Zeev Sternhell (1983) *Ni Droite, ni gauche: l'idéologie fasciste en France*. Paris: Seuil; Robert Soucy (1986) *French Fascism: The First Wave, 1924-1933*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Robert Soucy (1995) *French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933-39*. New Haven: Yale University Press. A particularly insightful essay is William D. Irvine (1991) ‘Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix de Feu’, in *Journal of Modern History* 63, 2 (June 1991): 271-95.

<sup>9</sup> Romain Rolland’s article appeared first in *Vendredi* of 24 January 1936, but was then reprinted in the pages of *Le Barrage* on 6 February 1936, where it elicited a concerted condemnation from Georges Pioch and Félicien Challaye.

<sup>10</sup> Leaders of the minority included Félicien Challaye, Georges Demartial, the historian Georges Michon, Mathias Morhardt (formerly Secretary-General of the Ligue), René Gerin, Léon Emery and Michel Alexandre, to name but a few.

<sup>11</sup> The original is in the Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Archives de la Ligue des droits de l’homme, FΔRés 798/7 (Correspondance de Mathias Morhardt). Mathias Morhardt to Georges Demartial, Capbreton, 19 March 1936. This letter was also published in *Le Barrage* 91 (26 March 1936), p. 3.